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DWELLING, ARCHETYPE AND IDEOLOGY

Kimberly Dovey

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The essays address the task of

rather, as the not-yet-pondered, it belongs to the realm of the mysterious, upon which we must meditate. Reflection on the past makes clearer how hard it is to imagine the future. Not surprisingly, it is necessary to proceed from what we have valued and remember as well as from what we imagine and hope for. Gregory Hise's essay, "Living in the 'Town of Tomorrow' Today: 1939 World's Fair," examines how seeking the future in the strange and faraway may lead us to find it in what was close at hand but initially unrecognized as a rich resource.

Thus, the essays in this journal of CENTER help us understand prior and other modes of dwelling and also enable us to better interpret our current situation. They all address the task of learning to dwell by exploring what might be retrieved in a manner adapted to today, or avoided, if we are to solve the problems of how to design, plan, and build affordably and in a socially and environmentally appropriate manner. In the end, sharper and stronger questions are taised about how our buildings and actions operate in classed, gendered, racial, and consumerist patterns of inclusion and exclusion; about how archetypal patterns still dance forth in ever new guises, for a new play in which we participate. By such questioning, we begin to explore our potential for dwelling.

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
Photographs by Robert Mugerauer

Dwell: To make one's home (twellan: to seduce, to deceive). Dwelling, according to Heidegger, includes not just where we live, but how we live and who we are. From this view, the nature of dwelling is inextricably embedded in the experience of Being-in-the-world. Heidegger maintained that an authentic art and architecture is rooted in dwelling, in a chthonic spirit of expression which springs from an authentic connection with place. The Australian Aboriginal connection to the landscape and its expression in art is a good example. Or, drawing from his world, Heidegger wrote approvingly of a Black Forest farmhouse, where "the self-sufficiency of the power to let earth and heaven, divinities and mortals enter in simple oneness into things, ordered the house..." (see figure).

Concurrent with this philosophy of dwelling, the Nazi's developed their ideology of 'blood and soil'. Folk architecture was propagandized as a representation of an authentic German spirit, with a deep connection to the earth—a conflation of "soil" and "soul". Many of the Nazi youth camps and Hitler's summer retreat at Karinhall were of this type—rusticated, thatched or whatever the local folk style demanded.

What might we learn from these phenomena? There is, in my view, nothing whatever wrong with German folk architecture, although it still wears the semiotic stain of that era. Its authenticity was the very thing that made it ripe for appropriation (which was also an expropriation). And Heidegger's support for Nazism does not negate his philosophical contribution. It does, however, seriously problematize it, since authenticity was appropriated as a tool of tyranny. My concern, however, is not with this particular example, but with the general question of the relation of the theory and practice of dwelling to issues of ideology. My aim is to further problematize this relationship in order to explore an argument that I believe we need to have about the nature and nurture of the dwelling experience.

Recognition of the problem is present in Heidegger's work (which has been a source for a philosophy of both dwelling and deconstruction). Heidegger invented the tactic, now popularized by Derrida, of writing 'under erasure'. When using the word 'Being' he would cross it out with diagonal lines and let both the word and its erasure stand. For Heidegger,



"Blood and Soil" mythology or authentic folk architecture, Fischerhude, Northern Germany.

'Being' precedes, and cannot not be captured by, language. Writing 'under erasure' was his manner of indicating that the connection of language to reality is problematic. Since this paper is an exploration of architecture as a language of dwelling, it is also an attempt to speak about the unspeakable.

William James' famous distinction between "toughmindedness" and "tendermindedness" is in his Voisities of Holigious Experience (New York: Modern Library, 1929).

² Jung's ideas may be most readily available in the following: Only G. Jung, Message, Breams, Reflections (New York: Vintage Books, 1965) and Joseph Campbell, ed., The Portable Jung (New York: The Viking Press, 1971).

³ For the basic texts discussing the nature of dwelling, see the essays collected in Martin Heidegger. *Poetry, Language, Thought* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971).

From the extensive literature on the relation of action or ritual and dwelling, see especially, Kimberly Dovey, "Home and Homelessness," in Irwin Altman and Carol Werner, eds., Home Environments, vol. 8. Human Behavior and Environment: Advances in Theory and Research (New York: Plenum Press, 1985); David Saile, "The Ritual Establishment of Home," Ibid.; Christopher Alexander, "Patterns of Events," in The Timeless Way of Building (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979); Miles Richardson, "Beingin-the-market versus Being-in-the-plaza: Material Culture and the Construction of Social Reality in Spanish America," American Ethnologist, 1982, pp. 421-136.

⁵ The growing literature concerned with "sense of place" testifies in the importance of this issue. See especially Edward Relph. Place and Place (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis: Preas, 1977); Christian Norberg-Schulz, Genius Loci (New York: Rizzoli, 1980); David Seamon and Robert Mugerauer, eds., Dwelling, Place and Environment (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989).

The dialectics of vertical/horizontal and inside/outside: Facing page, top: Prairie House, Frank Lloyd Wright, Heartley House, Oak Park, Illinois, 1906. Facing page, left, middle: Glenn Murcutt, Ball House, New South Wales. Facing page, left, bottom: Nankani housing, Upper Volta. Facing page, right, bottom: Christopher Alexander, Sala House, California.

Much of what follows, and especially the terms *dwelling*, *archetype*, and *ideology*, should be considered as 'under erasure'.

With this in mind I want to outline two opposing ways of looking at the experience of dwelling: essentialist versus relativist. The first view posits certain universal essentials of the dwelling experience, while the second denies them. For rhetorical purposes I will oversimplify and characterize them as the *archetypal* view and the *ideological* critique. I shall then examine the relationship between them as they bear upon issues of house and home as both *archetype* and *ideology*.

The Archetypal View


In the first view, the forms of dwelling, while manifest in highly diverse cultural variations, have universal roots which are somehow natural, ecological or archetypal. In this view, dwelling names the capacity for intrinsic meaning and the task is to get in touch with this deeper universal sub-structure of the dwelling experience. This sub-structure is linked to the human body as person, and to the structures of human perception and action in space. I will call it the archetypal position to be provocative and because it holds the hope that designers may tap a bedrock of natural or archetypal symbolism to generate powerful meanings in everyday life. In the Jungian sense, archetypes are formless structures of meaning in the collective unconscious that may become manifest through form in everyday life. Thus, archetypal symbolism is immanent in the world, rather than reflecting transcendent, ideal forms in any Platonic sense.

Most phenomenological approaches locate the human body as a primary source of spatial meaning. Merleau-Ponty argues that the very concept of space is constituted from a "gearing" of our body to the world. Norberg-Schulz posits the vertical axis on a horizontal plane as an "existential space," reflecting at once both the structure of the upright human body on the earth and an axis mundi connecting earth and sky. The oppositions of front/rear, left/right and up/down become the primary axes of this archetypal space. The house has often been described as a metaphoric body: walls as skin, roof as head, facade as face, and so on. While the formal and symbolic details differ markedly cross-culturally, anthropo-


morphic symbolism related to the house is pervasive in the anthropological literature.⁶


Harries argues for a sub-structure of natural archesymbols which are based in a set of universal oppositions; primarily vertical/horizontal and inside/outside. The first of these entails a recognition of the horizontality and verticality of being. This is linked to the universal experience of gravity, both our intuition of load and support, and the symbolization of human aspiration as directed against gravity. One expression of this is in Bachelard's cellar/garret opposition. The opposition inside/outside has been linked to an archetypal structure of the experience of "home" as the center of a dialectic of order/chaos, security/danger, and the familiar/strange. Such archetypal structures are not prescriptive of architectural form, they are more a source of meaning than of form. They are given a variety of formal interpretations from Wright's earth-hugging and hearth-centered prairie houses, to Murcutt's lightly articulated connections of inside to outside and of earth to sky. Many of Alexander's patterns are manifestations of these oppositions. "Sheltering Roof" and "Ceiling Height Variety" engage with the vertical/horizontal dimension while the inside/outside dialectic is manifest through patterns such as "Entry Transition" and "Window Place." Indigenous architecture further shows the enormous variety of expression of these oppositions (see figures).

Some writers see an archetypal link in the idea of a primitive hut, perhaps represented by the aedicula, or in the cave as a first model of the house.10 Others posit a set of archetypal connections with elements of the natural world- fire, water, plants, sunlight, earth and stone— as well as a more generalized connection to landscape, sky and cosmos. Thus archetypal meaning is thought to connect architecture to both the microcosm of the body and the macrocosm of a larger cosmic or ecological system. This view has philosophical connections to Bateson's notion of an ecology of mind, to Sheldrake's proposed morphogenetic fields and to Fuller's ecological aesthetics.11 Though I cannot do credit here to the range of archetypal approaches, the differences between them, their strengths and considerable weaknesses, my purpose is to at least introduce the position in a manner that will enable us to explore its tension with the various critiques of architecture as









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• The Ideological Critiques

Ideology is a highly problematic term. It may be defined as both the critique of the nature and source of ideas, and as the taken-for-granted framework of ideas which constitutes our world. Ideology, in this sense, is not a "false" consciousness that we might stand outside of and criticize; rather, it is a necessary condition for meaningful experience. An ideological critique sees the dwelling experience as predominantly or wholly a social construct. Ideology is immanent in everyday life, in the forms and structures of architecture.12 It underlies the dwelling experience as a package of cultural beliefs about the "good life," the "nice house," about property, individualism, status, and identity. Any talk of archetypes is seen as dangerous from this view because it reduces social reality to certain unchanging essentials. It confuses the typical with the archetypal. Beyond such a broad introduction, the ideological critiques are too diverse with too many internal disagreements, to permit any univocal description. However, I will briefly introduce some relevant, common themes.

Barthes' key contribution in semiotics has been to explicate the social construction of myth which occurs when an arbitrary meaning is made to seem natural and therefore remains unquestioned. From this view, the danger of an archetypal approach to dwelling is that arbitrary forms of dwelling will be raised to the level of myth as the archetypal dwelling experience. The single-family detached house has established its position as the ideal house type through the weaving of a myth which conflates it with a naturalized image of nuclear family, home, security, independence, and individualism. In many contexts, the single-family detached house has become so naturalized as to form a sub-structure to all discourse about dwelling.

We not only construct this myth, it constructs us. Bourdieu argues that the built environment embodies divisions and hierarchies between things, persons, and practices which preserve and perpetuate social order. "The most successful ideological effects" he claims, "are those that have no words, and ask no more than complicitous silence." Thus architecture, as the taken-for-granted context of social life, reproduces social structure and ideology more effectively than if it were

brought to consciousness. Differentiation between genders within the household and between races and classes through house type and location are centrally structured through built form. The anthropological evidence for this also is considerable, but, it is rather more difficult for us to see in our own culture. When women are trapped into suburban housework and child care, the situation has been seen as somehow natural. Similarly, our manifestation of the dialectic between "home" and "away" serves patriarchal ends. The suburban ideology, founded on a 19th century retreat from the urban excesses of industrialism and capitalism, constructs a gender based division between home and work. This division privileges a male-dominated formal economy while it devalues the informal economy of the household. It creates a male myth that home is a place of consumption and rest, while for many women it is a place of production and entrapment.15 The archetypal image of home as haven is used in support of this myth and the naturalization process is aided by the archetypal structure of the suburban form. The detachment in space with a pitched roof and front/rear orientation is congruent with a human standing erect on a horizontal ground with a vertical aspiration. The ideology of the house seems natural because the symbolic discourse has been mobilized in the interest of privilege (see figure).

Locating archetypal meaning in self-identity and the structure of the body is especially problematized by the critiques of the social construction of the subject. Foucault argues that overt forms of hierarchical power in society have been displaced by disciplinary technologies which constitute the body as subject. ¹⁶ All of this undermines any notion of a supposedly autonomous subject, inhabiting a "natural" body, with access to original meanings. From this view, self-identity and even the body are social constructs. Nothing is sacred; indeed, the "sacred" is especially suspicious.


There is also a range of work which argues that architectural symbolism has been subverted by the commodification of architecture under capitalism. Harvey, Jameson, Lipman and others have argued that the broad cultural shift from modernism to postmodernism, while embodying liberating aspects, also embodies a new "depthlessness" of cultural life that involves a triumph of surface over depth.¹⁷ In architec-

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ture, built form has been detached from its social context. In this view, postmodernism represents the commodification of meaning under the aesthetic guise of a revival of meaning. Architectural symbolism gains renewed importance as symbolic capital. 18 Style becomes a form of currency as the exchange-value of buildings dominates their use-value in everyday life. The qualities of lived experience in the built environment, based in usevalue, become secondary to the quantities of exchange-value. Buildings become formal texts to be decoded or read rather than an integral part of a world in which we dwell and act. The dwelling experience as a packaged commodity becomes reduced to a seductive image, because once we have been induced to buy, the image has fulfilled its role.

Baudrillard's work on the political economy of the sign takes this reduction further. ¹⁹ He argues that capital is now concerned with the production of signs and images rather than things. Use-value is reduced to the meaning of the image in an economy governed by codes of signification wherein symbols are consumed. From this view, what is crucial is not *dwelling, archetype* or *home* as experienced, but that the consumer finds such a meaning in the commodty.

The philosophy of deconstruction involves a persistent questioning of the nature and structure of meaning through textual analysis. Derrida regards the relationship between signifier and signified, between form and connotation, to be unstable, always



Reproducing patriarchy. Model house advertisement, Perth, 1984.

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subject to the play of meaning.25 From this view, language creates an illusion of stability and represses the play of meaning. Deconstruction opposes notions of unity, presence and authority, indeed of anything that perpetuates an illusion of stable meaning. The avowed aim is to expose buried metaphors and conceptual oppositions in a text and to undermine any presupposed correlation between language and reality. For Derrida, language privileges certain binary concepts while it represses the "other." Thus the posited universal oppositions of the archetypal position are to be interrogated and deconstructed as ideological constructs masquerading as essential truths.



Top: The spiral stair as type is at once evoked and playfully denied. Bernard Tschumi, Folie, Parc de la Villette, Paris. Bottom The entry is marked only as a 'gap' or an 'absence', a tactic which has been countered by the addition of the street lamp. Peter Eisenman, housing, Freidrichstrasse, Berlin.

Eisenman argues:

Architecture is so rooted in presence and in sceing itself as shelter and institution, house and home. It is the guardian of reality... I think this is the real problem... I think it is exactly in the home where the unhomely is, where the terror is alive.²¹

Thus, Eisenman's project is a war on the banal, the reassuring and the nostalgic which are conflated with any archetypal sense of dwelling. Formal types such as entrance, column, and even floor are at once evoked and then placed under erasure. His work systematically undermines the possibilities of semantic coherence and archetypal form, in an assault on the foundations of architectural meaning (see figures).

Deconstruction, as currently practiced in architecture, however, is an inadequate response to issues of ideology, both because of its detachment from social practice and its appropriation for ideological ends. The formal assault on the conventions of dwelling have led to a retreat to a gallery architecture of often unbuildable drawings. The attempt to undermine pure form remains ironically trapped in the pure form of drawings. The failure to simulate (and therefore re-construct) a possible (and therefore political) future makes the attack on the ideologies of architecture a feeble one. A further irony is that deconstruction's most successful constructions, such as Tschumi's folies at Parc de la Villette, have become ideological window-dressings for the French state. Deconstruction has beFrom this view, what is curcial is not dwelling, archetype or home as experienced, but that the consumer finds such a meaning in the commodity.

come reduced to a formal style, fragmented and severed from everyday life. At best, it helps to clear away ideological rubble in preparation for reconstruction. At worst, it reproduces the formal ideology of the profession, providing another round of images for consumption in the meaning market.²²

Oppositions

To sum up, the major weakness of any approach which posits universal structures of dwelling (here called the *archetypal* position) is that one cannot disentangle the *typical* from the *archetypal*. Further, any confusion of these two operates in the interest of existing power relations. The built environment plays a role in the production and perpetuation of social practice. The more its forms can be seen as archetypal, then the more effectively it enslaves us through its mythology, its structure, its disciplinary technologies, and its seductive imagery.

While we should be skeptical about the existence and nature of archetypal meaning, the major problem of those who would undermine any essentializing discourse by means of ideological critiques is the lack of a convincing argument that such meanings do not exist. Deconstructive philosophy has shown that structures of meaning are unstable, that the relationship of language to meaning is forever uncertain. It follows that the uncertainties of language preclude any certainty that all meaning is ideological. The lesson, it seems to me, is to explore this interface between the supposedly archetypal and the ideological critiques. A critique which convincingly undermines the naturalization of the arbitrary can easily slip into an equally unconvincing repression of the archetypal. With this in mind it seems that the unpacking of meaning through ideological critique may be useful for more than mere rugpulling.


This opposition between the supposedly universal and its ideological criticism has been playing out a gentle dialectic in my mind for years. It is one of those interminable conflicts where, although the arguments seem mutually exclusive, I am unable to adopt one without reconsidering the other. I would maintain that both sides of this argument are valid and necessary, but that neither alone is sufficient for an understanding of dwelling in our current circumstances. What if there are

powerful universal archetypes of dwelling experience, and, at the same time, experience is subject to powerful ideological control? To put it another way, what if the power of archetypal meaning is one of the tools of political and economic power? How can we reconcile the incorporation of Heidegger's authentic dwelling experience as a naturalized myth in Nazi ideology? And, more pertinently for current practice, how do we reconcile a belief in the depth of archetypal meaning with the proliferation of packaged archetypal imagery under capitalism?

• Model and Archetype

To this end I want to explore some of the models and corresponding images which drive the dwelling market on the outer rim periphery of our cities.²³ Here we are offered the ultimate range of dwelling experiences. The advertising brochures claim the exceptional, the exquisite, the different, the authentic. The landscape reveals endless variations of a standard norm with a pitched roof, many windows and chimneys, with a 2 or 3 car garage dominating the front facade. The house itself has a strong vertical element, usually detached in space with a pitched roof. Chimneys and other vertical elements figure strongly in the design. Inside the house, the vertical elements are continually featured. In one model "an exciting entry whisks you past a stately column." This is a discourse of status and stability; the primary load on these columns is symbolic and in some cases they are optional. The stairway is a pivotal point in the house and the idea too is a spiral movement embodying circular progress upwards. The advertised meanings are about elegance and grace: the stairs sweep, ascend and curve, often towards a skylight as they wind around the axis mundi of an indoor tree. The model houses are both "inspired by nature" and infused with it. Potshelves often fringe the main living spaces which are "bathed in light" from "delicately proportioned sunburst accent windows" (see figures).

Fireplaces proliferate and appear to be on a quest for authenticity and visibility in the absence of function. These fires are not for gathering, warmth and reverie as Bachelard would have it. ²⁴ They are visual props grafted on to almost





Top: The typical and/or the archetypal. Laguna Niguel, Southern California.

Bottom: Model House Plan, Southern California.

every room of the dwelling, including dining room, livingroom, family room, bathroom, breakfast nook, bedroom, recreation room, and library. The fireplaces are often constructed with elemental stone where they "beckon with hearths of marble," sometimes shedding their firelight onto the "coffered ceiling" of an archetypal "cave."

The apotheosis of the archetypal fetish is perhaps the new symbolism of the bathroom. Here you can lie in front of a marble hearth, in a "cultured onyx" spa-bath framed with mock Roman half-columns, under a "coffered ceiling," with your naked body bathed simultaneously in sunlight, firelight, and water. In this position you may gaze out from the refuge across the landscape or back to your own archetypal body reflected in a mirrored wall.

If I may use the term "archetype" a little more loosely now, there is evidence in these models of socially constructed "archetypes" of gender, family, and community. The girls' rooms





Top, left: Spiral stair as axis mundi.
Model House, Southern California.
Top, right: Fire and Water.
Model House, Northern California.
Middle, right: Reproducing gender, action and
mess. Model House, Northern California.
Bottom, right: Reproducing gender, an
orderly room with a view.

are pink with tea party and domestic imagery. The boys' rooms are filled with the promise of outdoor action, some even have some "mess" fixed to the bed and floor. The "family room" brings the family together as it reaffirms gender roles, and in one case comes complete with a stuffed *archetypal* family dog (see figures).

Moving to the larger scale, sociologists and politicians understood long ago that there is nothing like an external threat to bring a community together, and here developers selling sanctuary are making more money out of crime than are the criminals. Enclaves are produced with fortified boundaries to produce a commodified cameraderie of the elite against what is portrayed as a desperate underclass. "Siena" is a fenced enclave with a guard house in front of tuscan green automatic gates. The communal swimming pool has a pseudo-tuscan tower. The photograph in the brochure, captioned "Life as you always dreamed it," has been cropped to eliminate the sur-







rounding development which is not part of the medieval dream (see figures).

The trend towards enclaves is global, often including shopping, recreational and other facilities. "Sanctuary Cove" is eleven hundred acres of waterfront enclave near Brisbane, Australia, distinguished by the developer's willing, if foolish, explication of his intentions:


human, Every man has a right to protect his family, himself and his possessions. To live in peace and safety, Sanctuary Cove is an island of civilization in a violent world, and we have taken steps to ensure it

The reward for success (or inherited privilege) in this society is to opt out of it and abrogate any responsibility for or contact with its burgeoning social problems. If we examine the words "sanctuary" and "cove," we find them evocative of safety, protection, and enclosure on the one hand, and of

"sacredness" and "nature" on the other. Is the enclave not a packaged version of the archetypal home as communityhomogenous, enclosed, natural and defended against external threat? Yet is it not also a symptom of a failed civilization masquerading as civilization itself. ative is alive but privatized.

The dwelling experience is increasingly packaged to meet a desire for "freedom." But it is a strangely involut-

There is something irresistible about space for it brings with it a feeling of freedom and real contentment. It opens the door to endless possibilities.



The slogan for the development is "a touch of paradise." The utopian imper-

ed freedom which is identified with interior space, whether it be the house or the defended community. One model house advertisement claims:

The reward for success (or inherited privilege) in this society is to opt out of it and abrogate any responsibility for or contact with its burgeoning social problems.

This door opens inwards, not outwards, it is a dream of a privatized utopia and an individualized freedom. And despite the lavish production of myth in the brochures, there is also evidence that the desire is unrealizable. Most pages have small print saying that photographs are "color enhanced" and drawings are "artist's concepts." Most of the maps and even some of the floor plans are "not to scale." The litigation lawyers have done their job. One brochure shows a newlywed couple. The woman already has her shoes off and is standing on tiptoe. The small print says: "Photography not representative of actual product." These houses come with no guarantees.

Colonized Archetypes

I now want to link some of this material back into the discussion of the ideological critique of archetypal meaning. Is it simply by accident that the market focuses on what are often considered archetypal forms? The very fact that archetypes are seen as essential and unchanging meanings gives them a certain privilege in the market. They boost exchange-value. The more they seem to us natural and universal, the more we see them as transcending the glib, banal, and placeless products of the market. What I want to suggest is that archetypal meaning is not immune to being socially constructed; indeed, it is subject to a colonization process. This colonization begins with the reduction of archetype to a formal


Forms which seem to capture archetypal meaning at one time appear worn out a few years later. This could be evidence that the form was never archetypal, but it could also support the argument that the archetypal has been rendered banal through superficiality and overuse. The last twenty years of architectural production show evidence of the reduction of archetypal meaning to formal images (gables, towers, columns, arched entries) which have been overused to the point of cliché. Harries writes eloquently of this process which transforms what he calls natural symbols into meta-symbols which symbolize symbols.²⁶ There are many similarities between what is happening in the architectural

practice and in the model houses. The columns, fireplaces and stairs still speak to us, which is one explanation of their persistence in the market, but they have been reduced to signifiers of a deeper meaning which remains unrealized. This reduction proliferates in response to a burgeoning quest for "authenticity" which ironically fuels the production of such imagery through a semiotics of authenticity.²⁷ Archetypes are colonized by their placement in the service of an architectural meaning market which demands a continuous supply of

From the archetypal view, this process may be seen as a colonization of the human spirit. The superficial use of archetypal form and the fetish for the image pollute our intuitions of dwelling. Inasmuch as the archetype maintains a power over our emotions, this colonization represents a kind of reverse psychoanalysis wherein our subconscious is exploited and stripped of depth. The mass-market manipulations of archetypal imagery can become the colonization of our emotional life by the forces of economic or political power. The architectural and spatial experiences that have most potential to connect us to our world, are colonized and placed in the service of power, privilege, and profit.

While this proliferation of archetypal imagery holds the promise of a deeper dwelling experience, the imperatives of economic exchange contradict any resolution. Exchangevalue is served not by the satisfaction of desire but the ongoing production of envy. Four fireplaces, seven coffered ceilings, a cultured onyx spa-bath and a spiral stair can never be enough or consumption would cease.²¹ The process is not governed by a logic of archetypal meaning but by the logic of exchange. Exchange-value is served by the induction of housing into the fashion cycles of imagery.

A part of the dilemma is that fragmentation, homelessness, dislocation, and alienation in everyday life generate demand for a packaged and commodified dwelling experience. Our seduction by the pseudo-meaningful further reproduces this system. To dwell is to appropriate space—to claim it as part of our being. But the commodification of space and of everyday life distorts, undercuts, and fragments these processes of dwelling. The dwelling experience becomes a matter of taste rather than of authentic action.



Archetypes are colonized by their placement in the service of an architectural meaning market which demands a continuous supply of new imagery.

• Concluding Comments

I have no conclusions or answers to the conundrum I have tried to outline here, other than the suggestion that the dwelling experience is both archetypal and socially produced. The discussion and production of archetypal form in the absence of an understanding of the social production of meaning is dangerously flawed. Yet the denial of any archetypal foundation in architecture seems quite premature. The ideological critiques show a contingency (uncertainty or indeterminacy) of architectural meaning, not a proof of arbitrariness. Archetypal meaning is contingent in the double sense that such meaning remains tinged with uncertainty and is subject to the vagaries of a voracious meaning-market. The dwelling experience has no autonomy from the struggle for privilege, power and profit. Because archetypal meaning is not immune to ideology, the archetypal cannot be simply conflated with the good, the true, or the beautiful. The pursuit of archetypal meaning should be seen as an exploration of the power of meaning in architecture, a power which may be used and abused.

There is a serious danger in the treatment of archetypes in a prescriptive manner. It does not follow from an archetypal position that houses should replicate an archetypal image, only that the designer should recognize the meanings that are being evoked or denied through design. Anthropomorphic symbolism does not mean that houses should be detached or that roofs should be pitched. Rather it entails a self-critical recognition of the vertical/horizontal and inside/outside dialectics as key sources of creativity in architecture. Archetypal meaning is to be problematized, but not repressed.

The contradictions and dilemmas I have tried to outline in this paper are present in the very etymology of the term archetype. The root it shares with architecture—arche, means both "beginning," "original," and "ruler," or "chief." If we adopt archetypal meaning we should also take up various ideological critiques and address the questions—who is being ruled, by whom and in whose interest? And to return to the beginning of this paper there is an ambiguity in the term dwelling itself which means "to make one's home," but stems

from dwellan, which also means "to deceive, to seduce, to go astray."29 My plea is not for a middle ground between these opposing positions. It is for a sustained and rigorous dialogue between them. It may be argued that all I have done here is to muddy the waters. My aim, however, has been to articulate a debate between those who believe they can see the bedrock and those who believe, or imply, that there is nothing but ideology all the way down.

¹ Heidegger, M. Poetry, Language Thought, (New York: Harper & Row, 1971).

* Taylor, R. The Word in Stone: The Role of Architecture in National Socialist Ideology, (Berkeley: U.C. Press, 1974); Lane, B. Architecture and Politics in Germany, 1918-1945, (Cambridge: Harvard U.P., 1968).

³ Heidegger, M. Being und Time, (New York: Harper & Row, 1962); Derrida, J. Of Grammatology, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U.P., 1976), (see also translator's preface by G. Spivak).

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8 See for instance, Griale, M. Conversations with Ogolemelli, (New York: Oxford U.P., 1965); Blier, S. "Houses are Human," J. of Soc. of Arch Historians; 1983; 42

⁷ Harries, K. "The Voices of Space," Center, 4, 1988, pp. 34-49; Harries, K. "Thoughts on a Non-arbitrary Architecture," Perspecta, 20, 1983, pp. 9-20.

⁸ See: Buttimer, A. "Home, Reach and the Sense of Place," in A. Buttimer & D. Seamon (eds.) The Human Experience of Space and Place (London: Croom Helm, 1980), pp. 166-187; Dovey, K. "Home and Homelessness," in I. Altman & C. Werner (eds.) Home Environments, (New York: Plenum, 1985), pp. 33-64.

⁹ Alexander, C., Silverstein, M. & Jacobsen, M. A Pattern Language, (New York: Oxford U.P., 1977).

10 Rykwert, J. On Adam's House in Paradise, (New York: Museum of Modern Art,

¹¹ Bateson, G. Mind and Nature, (New York; Dutton, 1979); Fuller, P. Theoria: Art and the Absence of Grace, (London: Chatto & Windus, 1988); Sheldrake, R. A

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12 See: Althusser, L. For Marx, (London; Verso, 1969); Williams, R. Problems in Materialism and Culture, (London: Verso, 1980).

¹³Barthes R, Mythologies (Hertfordshire: Paladin, 1973); Barthes R, The Semiotic Challenge, (London: Blackwell, 1988).

¹⁴Bourdieu, P. Outline of a Theory of Practice, (London: Cambridge U.P., 1977). See also: Giddens, A. The Constitution of Society, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984); Saunders, P. & Williams, P. The Constitution of the Home, Housing Studies, 3 (2), 1988, pp. 81-93; Pred, A. Making Histories and Constructing Human Geographies, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990).

¹⁵ Hayden, D. Redesigning the American Dream, (New York: Norton, 1984); Spain, D. Gendered Spaces, (Chapel Hill: North Carolina U.P., 1992).

¹⁶Foucault, M. Power/Knowledge, (New York: Pantheon, 1980). See also: Fraser. N. Unruly Practices, (Minneapolis: Minnesota U.P., 1989); Grosz, E. Bodies-Cities, in: B. Colomina. (ed) Sexuality and Space, (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1992), pp. 241-254.

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¹⁸ The term comes from Bourdieu, op. cit.; see also Harvey, op. cit.; Dovey, K. "Corporate Towers and Symbolic Capital," Environment & Planning B, 19, 1992, pp. 173-188.

¹⁹Baudrillard, J. For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign, (St. Louis: Telos, 1981); Baudrillard, J. The Mirror of Production, (St. Louis: Telos, 1975).

²⁰Derrida, op. cit.

Interview with Jencks, in: Jencks, C. Deconstruction in Architecture, AD Monograph, 1988, pp. 49-61.

²²For more developed versions of this argument see: Dovey, K. "Architecture with French Dressing," Arena, 87, 1989, pp. 22-28.

²³The examples here are primarily from Laguna Niguel, Southern California and Antioch, Northern California. For a related critique of Australian model houses see: Dovey, K. "Model Houses and Housing Ideology in Australia," Housing Studies, 7 (3) 1992, pp. 177-188.

²¹Bachelard, G. The Psycholanalysis of Fire, (Boston: Beacon, 1964).

²⁵ Quoted in: Shaw K. (ed.) Bayside Views, Melbourne, 1988, p. 22.

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²⁷Dovey, K. "The Quest for Authenticity and the Replication of Environmental Meaning," in: D. Scamon & R. Mugerauer, (eds) Dwelling, Place and Environment, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985), pp. 33-49.

²⁸Baudrillard, 1981, op. cit.

²⁹Skeat, W. Etymological Dictionary of the English Language, (New York: Perigee, 1980); Webster's New World Dictionary, (New York: World Publishing, 1968).

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